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Rehabilitating an Empire: Humanitarian Collusion with the Colonial State during the 
Kenyan Emergency, c.1954-1960 
 
In September 1954, at the height of a bloody war between British colonial forces and the 
Kenyan anticolonial movement, Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
received an offer of help from an unexpected source. Brigadier Tony Boyce, the Chairman of 
the Save the Children Fund, suggested that humanitarian organisations should carry out what 
KH WHUPHG DQ ³2SHUDWLRQ $QYLO IRU FKLOGUHQ´ LQ 1DLUREL1 Replicating the Operation Anvil 
launched by the British army and colonial police, which involved the capture and imprisonment 
of suspected Mau Mau rebels, Boyce suggested that humanitDULDQRUJDQLVDWLRQVVKRXOG³URXQG
XS´FKLOGUHQDJHGEHWZHHQWHQDQGVHYHQWHHQDQGSODFHWKHPLQUHVLGHQWLDOVFKRROVZKHUHWKH\
ZRXOGEH ³UH-HGXFDWHG WR VXSSRUW WKH FRORQLDO FDXVH´2 Boyce also envisaged a network of 
kindergartens where the children of Mau Mau suspects would be provided with milk and 
PHGLFDO FDUH WR ³VRIWHQ´ WKHLU PRWKHUV¶ DWWLWXGHV to British rule.3 The Kenyan emergency 
presented the Save the Children Fund with an ³RSSRUWXQLW\to establish an active partnership 
between the government and YROXQWDU\ZRUNHUV«LQWKHFRORQLDOWHUULWRULHV´4  
The Save the Children Fund was not the only aid organization enticed by the 
µopportunity¶ presented by the Kenyan Emergency. As postwar reconstruction projects wound 
down in Europe, many aid organisations sought new roles. In 1948, the British Red Cross 
transferred a number of its workers from Europe to Malaya during another colonial emergency. 
Red Cross nurses had participated in a campaign against anticolonial resistance, attempting to 
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win the µhearts and minds¶ of Malayans through education and sanitation projects. It seemed 
to Red Cross Overseas Branch Director Joan Whittington that such methods could be 
redeployed in Kenya.5 For the British Red Cross, as for Save the Children, the Kenyan 
emergency was a part of a wider reorientation from postwar Europe to the decolonizing British 
Empire, where they used their credibility as µinternational¶ agents to divert criticism from 
colonial barbarity.  
This article examines humanitarian collusion with the colonial state during the Kenyan 
emergency, analysing how organizations that claimed to exemplify the progressive 
internationalism of the post-war period colluded with colonial violence. Aid organizations were 
deeply implicated in projects for women and children that sought to weaken anticolonial 
resistance, importing new humanitarian expertise developed in wartime Europe and adapting 
it to racist, colonial norms. Thus, humanitarian organizations lent credence to the myth that 
rehabilitation in Kenya was a progressive programme enacted by a liberal empire to modernise 
its subjects, rather than a ruthless attempt to stymy anticolonial resistance. In this case, postwar 
humanitarian internationalism did not challenge, but enabled, colonial brutality. 
In the aftermath of the Second World War British imperialism was seeking to repurpose 
itself as a developmental and democratising force, in line with new international norms.6 It was 
at this moment that colonial violence reached its zenith in a series of wars of decolonization 
(so-FDOOHGµHPHUJHQFLHV¶WKDWUDJHGIURPWKHODWHVWRWKHPLG-1960s. 7  In Kenya, a state 
of Emergency was declared in 1952, as Mau Mau guerrillas engaged in an insurgency 
campaign that aimed to end British rule in Kenya. The colonial government embarked upon a 
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programme of incarceration and ³rehabilitation´ WR ³FOHDQVH´ VXVSHFWHG 0DX 0DX RI WKHLU
anticolonial beliefs, in which insurgents were detained, propagandised and often tortured.8  
In recent years, two distinct literatures have examined the two faces of the postwar 
British Empire. New histories of international order have demonstrated the ideological 
convergence between twentieth-century imperialism and the ideology of internationalism.9 
Meanwhile, a burgeoning literature on imperial violence has revealed the illiberal repression 
at the heart of the µliberal¶ British Empire.10 Through an examination of humanitarianism at 
the end of empire, this article places these two emerging literatures (one on the intersection of 
internationalism and imperialism, and the other on colonial violence) in conversation.  
The emerging literature on international aid in the twentieth-century has shown how 
internationalist humanitarian tradition emerged from colonial empires (most often the British 
Empire), and continued to embody and propagate imperial norms after decolonization. In this 
literature, humanitarian organisations are characterised as µLPSHULDO¶ LQ WKH VHQVH WKDW WKH\
shared attitudes, ideas and even personnel with the official machinery of empire.11 Aside from 
recent examinations of the role of the ICRC during colonial emergencies in Africa, we still 
know little about how international aid originations interacted with imperialism as both an 
ideology and a set of violent practices.12 Through an examination of the Save the Children 
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Fund and the British Red Cross in the Kenyan Emergency, this article reveals how, by aiding 
in the so-FDOOHG µUHKDELOLWDWLRQ¶ RI WKH .LNX\X KXPanitarianism became a vehicle for 
rehabilitating the image of British imperialism. 
 
I.  
:KHQ6DYHWKH&KLOGUHQ¶VFKDLUPDQ7RQ\%R\FHarrived at Nairobi airport in September 1954, 
he walked into the midst of a moral panic about the state of Kikuyu youth. Rapid urbanisation 
and stringent vagrancy laws had led to rising prosecution rates of young men, who had been 
coming to Nairobi in search of work since the end of the Second World War.13 Though the 
majority of prosecutions related to travelling without a pass or petty criminality, colonial 
officials used rising crime rates as evidence of the influence of the Mau Mau movement in 
urban youth.14 Many Mau Mau fighters were under twenty-five, and the colonial government 
claimed that male youths were a µsoft target¶ for anticolonial propaganda.15 Children as young 
as four were alleged to be acting as runners for messages and supplies passed between Mau 
Mau insurgents in Nairobi and the surrounding countryside.16  
Prosecution rates for apolitical crimes such as theft and vagrancy sharply rose after the 
State of emergency was declared in Kenya in 1952.17 In the dislocation and upheaval caused 
by the mass incarceration of 900,000 suspected Mau Mau, and WKHFKDRVRIWKH³YLOODJL]DWLRQ´
schemes that forcibly relocated Kikuyu communities, many left for Nairobi, accelerating the 
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urban flight that had been a feature of the young Kikuyu experience for decades.18 The vast 
farms owned by white settlers had led to severe land shortages for Africans. Kikuyu men, who 
were unable to attain the resources needed to begin new family units and become economically 
independent from their elders, felt this land shortage acutely. In frustration, many young men 
left the reserves designated by the colonial state as Kikuyu farmland for the city.19 
Rather than reforming land allocation, the colonial government sought to remake 
colonial subjects, incarcerating suspected Mau Mau for ³UHKDELOLWDWLRQ´%R\FHDUJXHGWKDWQR
attempt to remake the Kikuyu would be complete without a concerted effort to rehabilitate 
children. His first suggestion of ³2SHUDWLRQ$QYLOIRUFKLOGUHQ´ZDVUHMHFWHGE\WKH&RORQLDO
Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, on the grounds that rounding up Kenyan women and children 
by force for screening and imprisonment would lead to an international outcry.20 However, his 
contention that remaking youth held the key to remaking society found a powerful advocate in 
Thomas Askwith, the Colonial Commissioner for Community Development and a key architect 
of the adult rehabilitation scheme.  
Askwith, the former principle of a development training academy founded and funded 
by the Colonial state, favoured a liberal, µgentle¶ approach to rehabilitation. The Kikuyu, he 
believed, were caught between tradition and modernity. As historian Paul Ocobock has argued, 
Askwith had come to view the emergency as a generational conflict produced by the 
psychological effects of missionary education and urbanization.21 Drawing upon the work of 
psychiatrists and ethnographers such as Louis Leakey and J.C. Carothers, Askwith argued that 
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³WULEDOdiscipline has disappeared´GXHWRWKHIDFWWKDW\RXQJPHQZHUHPRUHHGXFDWHGWKDQ
their elders.22 0DX0DX$VNZLWKEHOLHYHGZDVDV\PSWRPRIWKH³GLVLQWHJUDWLRQ´RI D³ZKROH
JHQHUDWLRQ´SV\FKRORJLFDOO\GDPDJHGE\WKHDEVHQFHRIHOGHUDXWKRULW\23 %R\FH¶VGLDJQRVis 
RIMXYHQLOHGHOLQTXHQF\ILWQHDWO\ZLWK$VNZLWK¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIWKH0DX0DX movement as 
one of psychological distress, rather than political grievance. Though their conception of Mau 
0DX KLQJHG XSRQ D UDFLVW YLHZ RI ³EDFNZDUGV´ .LNX\X struggling with modernity, both 
Askwith and Boyce believed that remedies that the Save the Children Fund had pioneered for 
juvenile delinquents in a European context could be reconfigured for youth caught up in the 
Kenyan emergency.24  
There were few institutions to deal with the youngest suspected Mau Mau. The Child 
Protection (Emergency Regulation) Act of 1954 decreed that unaccompanied minors in Nairobi 
should be sent to reserves or missionary orphanages.25 However, the chaos of mass 
incarcerations and the overburdening of Nairobi municipal courts meant that many children 
and teenagers spent months in transit camps designed for µscreening¶ adults.26 Children as 
young as seven were beaten by prison guards, often going days without food, shelter, clothes 
and blankets.27 Living in such conditions and close to suspected adult Mau Mau, it seemed to 
Boyce inevitable that these boys ZRXOGEH³FRQWDPLQDWHGE\0DX0DX´LGHDV28  
Within the colonial administration there was confusion about the age at which youths 
ceased to be protected by the 1952 legislation and became legally adult.29 Consequently, the 
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problem of juvenile delinquency was passed around a number of departments, all reluctant to 
accept responsibility.30 The Save the Children Fund had recently had its own debates about the 
distinction between childhood and youth, raising its own age limit for intervention from 14 to 
18, as part of its wider shift from focusing on the bodies of children to treating their minds. In 
the interwar period, the fund drew upon Victorian religious and romantic discourses to 
categorise children as innocent and apolitical, focused on material succour. After 1945, having 
witnessing the weaponization of adolescence by totalitarian states, the Fund became interested 
in the political potency of µyouth¶ (broadly, ages 12-18). It sought to provide moral and material 
interventions that would steer an emotionally-damaged generation towards an adulthood of 
democratic citizenship, in an era of anxiety about the rising tide of communism.31   
 )RU%R\FHWKH)XQG¶VQHZLQWHUHVWLQ\RXWKFRXSOHGZLWKWKH&RORQLDOsWDWH¶VOLPLWHG
provision for adolescents, provided an opportunity. The Save the Children Fund could enhance 
LWVSXEOLFVWDWXVE\DFWLQJDVDQ³DJHQWRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW´DQGJDLQORJLVWLFDOVXSSRUWLQDQHZ
context.32 Partnership with Save the Children benefitted the colonial government too, providing 
welfare services while preserving empire on the cheap.33 Humanitarian assistance also allowed 
the government to recast the meaning of colonial government and the Mau Mau struggle 
against it. Boyce linked the generational rupture in Kikuyu socieW\FHQWUDOWR$VNZLWK¶VYLHZ
of the emergency, to a wider discourse of child psychology. Citing the work of Save the 
Children in Europe, Boyce sought to convince Askwith that that the crisis of adolescence was 
a global postwar phenomenon, of which youth criminality in Kenya was part, but with specific 
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racial and national inflections. Where, in Europe, juvenile delinquency arose from the 
breakdown of familial ties, in Kenya it was due to the disintegration of the tribe.34   
Concern about the conditions of Kenyan youth, brought up with limited economic 
prospects and without the guidance of tribal elders, closely echoed similar panic about juvenile 
delinquency in postwar Europe. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, a cadre of child 
SV\FKRORJLVWVDQGSV\FKRDQDO\VWVVXFKDV$QQD)UHXGDQG-RKQ%RZOE\SRVLWHGWKDWFKLOGUHQ¶V
µattachment¶ to their parents (particularly their mothers) was the foremost predictor of healthy, 
mentally-stable adult life. In this context, the mass evacuations of children during the Second 
World War, and the orphaning or abandonment of children during the conflict, seemed to 
prefigure continent-wide social dislocation. The war generation, it was feared, would lead adult 
lives of criminality and further destabilise European politics.35 A sharp spike in so-called 
juvenile delinquency seemed to confirm these fears.36 As new borstals and reformatories were 
opened across the continent to contain young criminals, humanitarian organizations 
increasingly focused not on WKHWUDXPDRIZDURQFKLOGUHQ¶VERGLHVEXWRQWKHLUPLQGV 
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, social policy and humanitarian work within and 
beyond Europe was reconfigured to orientate provision for children within the family, and to 
recreate the structure of the family when parents were not available. Nascent European welfare 
states and postwar workforce policies conspired to push women back into the home to raise a 
generation of well-adjusted, emotionally-attached children. Where states themselves were not 
leading the drive for the creation of nuclear families, humanitarian organizations took up the 
slack. As Tara Zara and Sarah Feldstein have shown, American aid organizations sought to 
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reconstruct Europe and µmodernize¶ societies in north-east Asia and Latin America via the 
promotion and preservation of nuclear family units. Working in the early stages of the Cold 
War, these organizations sought not only to prevent the creation of a new generation of juvenile 
delinquents, but to ward off totalitarianism.37 
Save the Children seized upon the zeitgeist and proclaimed its own special interest and 
expertise in juvenile delinquency. Hosting a series of international conferences, Save the 
Children discussed best practice for the rehabilitation of delinquent youth and argued that 
institutions replicating the structure of nuclear families were the most likely to re-establish 
emotional stability.38 To replicate the bond between youth and parents, Save the Children-
sponsored reformatories organized juveniles into mixed age µhouses¶, each with their own 
leader, a trusted adult figure to act as a role model for discipline and support.39 This system of 
prefects, a house system, and multi-layered structures of authority, though based on new 
psychoanalytic observations, closely replicated a far older British tradition: boarding school. 
Yet boarding school was based on the premise that growing up in proximity to parents 
undermined the psychological robustness of young men, while reformatories were a response 
to the problem cUHDWHGE\WKHODFNRISDUHQWV¶HPRWLRQDOJXLGDQFHDQGDXWKRULW\40 Save the 
Children, an organization funded by aristocratic women in 1919, had become increasingly 
professionalised and masculine during its work with the British government during the Second 
World War.41 By the mid-1950s, its leadership comprised upper-class, former military men, all 
educated at boarding schools. The rhetoric of reformatories and attachment allowed them to 
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replicate the (to them) familiar traditional, aristocratic models of boarding school education, 
while VLPXOWDQHRXVO\GHVFULELQJ WKHPDV µinnovative¶. In Kenya, as in reformatories across 
Europe, the norms of elite British education were adapted for the education and punishment of 
criminal youth and young anticolonial activists.  
Although Save the Children and the colonial government used the European rhetoric of 
juvenile delinquency to describe the problems of Kenyan youth, they believed Kenyan youth 
had been damaged by lack of authority, but did not marry this with a discourse of parental 
attachment. Their foremost concern was not the severing of emotional ties between children 
and families, but KRZ µmodernity¶ had undermined parental authority. In the tradition of 
colonial stereotypes of African men, they believed Kikuyu boys lacked discipline, not positive 
forms of emotional support.42 Thus, where in Europe, solving the problem of juvenile 
delinquency hinged on µre-establishing¶ or mimicking the structures of the nuclear family 
(itself an invented tradition), in Kenya the challenge was to provide a proxy for tribal authority. 
Young men eager to participate in a wage economy and educated beyond their tribal elders± 
could not return to the traditional tribal life. It fell to the state and its allies to provide a new 
form of authority to juvenile delinquents.43 Within this framework, the youth µrehabilitation¶ 
schemes of the colonial government in Kenya became a progressive agenda, helping Kikuyu 
youths adjust to postwar modernity with the help of humanitarian experts and European 
scientific knowledge.44  
The colonial government began its relationship with Save the Children by asking Boyce 
to provide funding and staff IRU $VNZLWK¶V flagship project: Wamumu, a prison school for 
youths convicted of Mau Mau insurgency. The VWDWHG DLP RI :DPXPX ZDV ³OLEHUDO
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UHKDELOLWDWLRQUDWKHUWKDQSXQLVKPHQW´45 It drew on a mixture of µinnovations¶ learned from 
experimental juvenile reformatories across Europe, the traditions of the elite British public 
school system, and colonial forms of youth education and discipline, including scouting and 
mission schools.46 :DPXPX¶VOHDGHUVFODLPHGWRHQDEOH\RXQJPHQWRH[SHULHQFHZKDWZDV
left of their adolescence uncorrupted by Mau Mau ideology. Football and gymnastics enabled 
WKHER\VWR³EORZRIIVWHDP´ZKLOVWOHDUQLQJ³FR-operation and team-ZRUN´ZKLFKERWK%R\FH
and Askwith regarded as the hallmarks of colonial masculinity.47 Wamumu also sought to 
equip young men for economic self-sufficiency. Learning trades such as shoe-making, 
carpentry and mechanics led to given economic independence and thus, as Paul Ocobok shows, 
³SDWKZD\V WRPDQKRRG´ WKDWGLGQRWGHSHQGRQ land. Wamaumu sought not only to reform 
indivLGXDO µRIIHQGHUV¶ EXW WR UHPDNH WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ .HQ\DQ \RXWK WKH FRORQLDO
economy and tribal society.48 
Based on the success of Wamumu, the Save the Children Fund opened a second 
rehabilitation project in December 1954. Rather than young men from adult camps, this new 
project, Ujana Park, would house slightly younger boys, aged eight and up, removed from the 
streets of Nairobi and municipal gaols, although none of the children at Ujana Park had formal 
convictions. This was by design: the Save the Children council was concerned that if news got 
back to )XQG¶V supporters in the United Kingdom that donations were supporting delinquents, 
the surge in donations experienced at the start of the Kenyan emergency would dry up.49 
Instead, the Fund focused on children suspected of being µcontaminated¶ by Mau Mau but who 
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had not been formally charged or sentenced.  
Built on the site of the Latanga Prison in a suburb of Nairobi, Ujana Park was a 
surrounded by high barbed-wire fences and guarded by police. The headmaster of Ujana Park, 
Edward Turner, was typical of the postwar generation of colonial aid workers. He had fought 
in both world wars and after 1945 had optimistically turned his hand to tobacco farming in 
Kenya. Profit margins had been poor and when the emergency started, he summoned his wife, 
a former social worker, from England and offered his services to Save the Children. He was, 
in the words of the Nairobi Sunday Post, µno namby-pamby type with a touching faith in 
humanity¶.50 ,QVWHDGKHEURXJKWPLOLWDU\GLVFLSOLQHWREHDURQWKHFKLOGUHQKHGHVFULEHGDV³WKH
plague of Nairobi, accomplished little thieves and posse of thugs, many of whom were tainted 
ZLWKWKH0DX0DXGRFWULQH´51 
When the first boys arrived at the camp in December 1954, Turner described their 
disenchantment as they saw their new living quarters: ten basic, A-frame huts made from 
corrugated steel and without windows. The boys built roads in the Nairobi suburb of Karen. 
7KHUHZDV7XUQHUH[SODLQHG³QRFKDULW\DQGVRPHWKLQJIRUQRWKLQJ´7KHboys were earning 
their keep and being imbued with the work ethic that Save the Children hoped would make 
WKHP³IXWXUHZRUNLQJFODVVOHDGHUVRIWKH.LNX\X´52 Like Wamumu, Ujana Park was seeking 
to build the colonial citizens of the future, who would be integrated into the colonial economy 
with practical skills, but without the education viewed as a root cause of anticolonial unrest.53 
Ujana Park¶VYRFDWLRQDO model drew upon a long traditional of colonial education in 
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Kenya, which privileged practical training over literacy.54 This model had been used by Save 
WKH&KLOGUHQLQDVHULHVRI³ZRUNVFKRROV´LQ(DVWHUQ(XURSHDIWHUWKH)LUVW:RUOG:DU55 In 
 6DYH WKH &KLOGUHQ RSHQHG LWV ILUVW PDMRU HGXFDWLRQ SURMHFW RXWVLGH (XURSH D ³ZRUN
VFKRRO´QDPHG6HUHQGDKMXVWRXWVLGH.XDOD/XPSXULQ0DOD\D6HUHQGDKZDVIRXQGHGto teach 
crafts to working-class young men and keep them away from Communist youth leagues during 
0DOD\D¶VHPHUJHQF\7KHVFKRROZDVLQDIORZHU-lined, well-organized campus with purpose-
built workshops and airy dormitories.56 The haphazardly-constructed Ujana Park was 
XQGRXEWHGO\6HUHQGDK¶VSRRUHUXJOLHUVLEOLQJ,QGHHGZKLOH6HUHQGDK was frequently cited as 
the model for Ujana, the camp in fact far more closely resembled another Save the Children 
project in Somaliland, the Hargeisa Boys Home. Founded in 1952 to train vagrant boys 
suspected (but not convicted), of criminality, the Hargeisa Home was a constant headache for 
Save the Children. Also housed in corrugated iron A-frame huts, Hargeisa boys µearned their 
keep¶ by making sandals and tending to a golf course used by ex-pats. The boys frequently 
escaped, went on strike demanding payment for the sandals they made, and stole and sold items 
from the Home.57 Life at Unjaana Park appeared, to its headmaster Edward Turner at least, 
PRUHKDUPRQLRXVWKDQDW+DUJHLVD:KHQ7XUQHU¶VFDUEURNHGRZQQHDUWKHJDWHVLQ0D\
³WHQV of boys swarPHGWKURXJKDODUJHKROHLQWKHFDPS¶VIHQFHWRRIIHUWKHLUDVVLVWDQFH´To 
him, this suggested that the boys could have escaped at any point, but chose not to do so.58  
As in Ujana Park, escapes from Wamumu were rare. On one occasion, three boys 
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returned to the camp after a number of hours.59 /LIHZLWKLQWKHFRQILQHVRIWKHFDPSV¶ZDOOV 
with its beatings and solitary may have seemed preferable to vagrancy on the streets of Nairobi, 
or adult prisons.60 Indeed, in the latter years of the Emergency, Wamaumu was µGHPLOLWDUL]HG¶
and the number of guards reduced from 200 to 40. Of the almost one thousand graduates of 
Wamumu, not a single one reoffended.61 Wamumu was regarded as the flagship success of the 
Rehabilitation project.62 
Through their role in founding and funding two prison schools, the Save the Children 
Fund contributed to a wider reframing of Mau Mau resistance as an expression of the psychosis 
generated by a µtribal¶ society attempting to come to terms with modernity, rather than 
legitimate political grievance.63 Kenyan youth, caught between childhood and adulthood, 
served as a metaphor for DQ µLPPDWXUH¶ Kenyan society. Working with an internationally-
renowned humanitarian organization, the colonial government framed its reforms as 
progressive and compassionate. Humanitarian intervention leant legitimacy not only to the 
incarceration of teenage boys, but also to the wider campaign against Mau Mau.  
 
II.  
In the early days of the Kenyan Emergency, the colonial government assumed that African 
men were the drivers of conflict, and that African women were its victims.64 Prison provision 
reflected this, with just two of the one hundred prisons founded under the Emergency Act set 
aside for female inmates, and no µprison schools¶, youth camps or formal education 
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programmes for women.65 However, ZRPHQ¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQ0DX0DXXSHQGHGWKHORQJ-
held stereotype of African female passivity.66 According to a report filed by the Ministry of 
'HIHQFHLQZRPHQZHUHQRWVLPSO\³IHHGLQJDQGKDUER>X@ULQJPHQIRON´EXWUDther had 
EHFRPHWKH³PDLQVWD\V´RI0DX0DXDFWLQJDVVSLHVUXQQHUVDQGFRPEDWDQWV67  
)RU WKHPRVWSDUW WKHFRORQLDOJRYHUQPHQWDWWHPSWHG WR WDNHD³VRIWHU´DSSURDFK WR
rebellious women, believing that women were more malleable than men, and therefore more 
likely to respond to rehabilitation efforts outside the prison pipeline. Although over 8,000 
women were incarcerated in the prison camps at Gitamayu and Kamiti, most experienced the 
emergency rural areas.68 Between 1954 and 1956, the colonial government constructed 854 
villages, home to 1,077,500 Kikuyu and Embu people. These new villages were to remake 
Kenyan agriculture by consolidating small plots of land and enforcing new farming methods, 
as well as enabling the surveillance of the Kikuyu population.69 New villages deemed 
supportive of Mau Mau insurgency were surrounded by barbed wire fences and spiked 
trenches. Adults participated in daily forced labour, attempting to cultivate the barren 
landscape. In villages where the population was deemed to have become less supportive of 
0DX0DXFXUIHZVZHUHOLIWHGDQGFRQGLWLRQVLPSURYHG,QYLOODJHVGHHPHGWREHLQµDFWLYH
VXSSRUW¶RI0D\0DXIood was scarce, disease rampant and punishment severe.70  
The District Commissioners overseeing the villages quickly realized their inadequacy, 
fearing that poor living conditions would create resentment and µgive rise to problems far worse 
than Mau Mau.¶71 Throughout 1955, Askwith wrote to Evelyn Baring, the Governor of Kenya, 
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petitioning for increased funding from the colonial government for welfare officers to work 
with µMau Mau infected women¶ LQ UXUDODUHDV.72 He believed that women and girls on the 
fringes of Mau Mau would be µseduced¶ by the movement if they lacked social status and 
occupation. As with boys in Ujana and Wamumu, Askwith intended to teach women skills that 
he believed would make them economically independent and less susceptible to µmanipulation¶ 
by Mau Mau men. Teaching women homecraft and mothercraft (skills he assumed would be 
valued because they would µhelp the women get husbands¶) would show Kikuyu women that 
the government was µwilling to help them¶.73 Educating Kikuyu women would also create fit 
counterparts for men rehabilitated by the pipeline process, so that they would not arrive from 
SULVRQWRILQGWKDW³WKHLUZLYHVZHUHDVSULPLWLYHDVWKHLUPRWKHUVKDGEHHQ´74  
Rather than increasing financial support for rural women, Baring relied instead on 
0DHQGHOHR \D :DQDZDNH PHDQLQJ ³ZRPHQ¶V SURJUHVV´ LQ 6ZDKLOL )RXQGHG LQ 
0DHQGHOHRUHFHLYHGDVPDOODQQXDOJUDQWIURP$VNZLWK¶V&RPPXQLW\'HYHORSPHQW)XQGEXW
was largely led by female white settler volunteers. In the long tradition of imperial feminism, 
Maendeleo was presented as an expression of sisterhood and solidarity between African and 
settler women, but in reality it was a paternalistic attempt to educate women in Western norms 
of motherhood and domesticity.75 In 1954, as the emergency intensified, Askwith sought 
UHLQIRUFHPHQWIRU0DHQGHOHR¶VDFWLYLWLHVIURPWKH%ULWLVK5HG&URVV76 The British Red Cross 
had been in Kenya since the First World War, when a branch was founded to raise funds and 
send supplies to British troops. Patronized entirely by white settlers, the Red Cross had 
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provided support and supplies to colonial policemen and prison guards in the early days of the 
emergency.77 $VNZLWK¶VSOHDIRUVXSSRUWRIIHUHGWKH5HG&URVVDQRSSRUWXQLWy to extend its 
work, and recast its vision of imperial duty. Instead of working only for the brotherhood of 
whitesWKH5HG&URVVZRXOGQRZWXUQLWVDWWHQWLRQVWRWKH(PSLUH¶Vµless civilized subjects¶, 
demonstrating that even at a time of tension between white settlers and Mau Mau, British 
imperialism was a force for good.78  
Affiliated with the International Red Cross movement, the Kenyan branch of the British 
Red Cross was able to draw upon an international network of donors and expertise during the 
emergency. In April 1955, it recruited twenty-ILYHµKRPHFUDIWRIILFHUV¶IURP%ULWDLQWRZRUNLQ
the villages of the Central Province, bolstering the efforts of Maendeleo. The Red Cross 
officers split their time between thirteen villages each, travelling between them in large white 
/DQGURYHUV SURYLGHG E\ 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &KLOGUHQ¶V (PHUJHQF\ )XQG
(UNICEF).79 In addition to leading sewing, knitting and baking classes, Red Cross workers 
examined children for signs of malnutrition and disease and promoted hygiene through baby-
washing competitions. Dirty children were forbidden to participate in games and denied food 
from Red Cross soup kitchens.80 The most severely malnourished babies were fed with milk 
powder provided to the British Red Cross by UNICEF and the US government under the Share 
Our Surplus scheme.81 Working under the well-known red cross symbol, the British Red Cross 
brought international humanitarian resources and international expertise to the colonial crisis.82 
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Most of the twenty-five relief workers who arrived in Nairobi in the middle of 1955 
had prior experience working with displaced populations in Central Europe in the aftermath of 
the Second World War, and then worked alongside the British government in its villagization 
programme during the Malayan emergency, where they had founded soup kitchens, and led a 
public information campaign about the benefits of teeth-brushing.83 By the end of 1953, the 
British Red Cross stated that their relief workers had met the medical and nutritional needs of 
almost 400,000 people. Through craft classes intended to build trust and companionship 
between aid workers and villagers, the Red Cross cast itself as an auxiliary of a wider 
programme to win over Malayan people, the colonial state and the British imperial cause. 84   
The British response to the Malayan emergency was fought on two fronts. Running 
parallel to military counterinsurgency was a propaganda war designed to win 0DOD\DQµhearts 
and minds¶Dphrase itself famously coined by General Gerald Templar during the conflict. 
The colonial state also used the term µrehabilitation¶ to describe the mixture of propagandizing 
and torture anticolonial fighters and their civilian supporters were subjected to, framing these 
practices as medical interventions.85 It cast anticolonial insurgency as a form of psychological 
deviance, and imprisonment, propaganda and torture as the cure.86  
Thomas Askwith, the Kenyan Colonial Commissioner for Community Development, 
had visited Malayan villages and prisons in 1953 to obVHUYH 7HPSODUV µKHDUWV DQG PLQGV¶
approach to counterinsurgency.87 In Kenya, Askwith built upon the medicalization of pro-
British propaganda that Templar had pioneered. From the outset of the Kenyan Emergency a 
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government-led Rehabilitation Committee drew on pseudo-psychological and ethnological 
work to frame Mau Mau sympathies as a form of psychosis. Prisoners were subjected to 
deprivation, interrogation and, often, physical abuse. Having passed through this µpipeline¶, 
they were then supposed to confess their crimes, and renounce Mau Mau. Prisoners were then 
propagandized about the benefits of British rule and perhaps educated for participation in a 
colonial, capitalist economy.88 Because Mau Mau was regarded as a symptom of a problem 
with deep social and cultural roots, rehabilitation via propaganda and education was prescribed 
for not only prisoners, but the entire society.  
,Q ERWK .HQ\D DQG 0DOD\D WKH FRORQLDO VWDWH¶V GLVFRXUVH RI FXUDWLYH UHKDELOLWDWLRQ
chimed with longstanding traditions of the British Red Cross. In early twentieth-century 
humanitarian vocabulary, µrehabilitation¶ signalled the dual medical and moral purpose of 
humanitarian interventions. After wars and disasters, aid organizations prided themselves on 
far-reaching interventions that would shape characters and communities for years to come.89 
From 1914, the British Red Cross had pioneered the use of haptic, craft activities as a means 
to divert and occupy recuperating soldiers in military hospitals. Drawing on Victorian 
philanthropy, the Red Cross described this craft as µrehabilitation¶ because it aided physical 
and emotional recovery, restoring VROGLHUV¶GLJQLW\WKURXJKODERXU90 Such schemes in Europe 
drew on idealized imaginings of a peasant past, as working-class soldiers were taught to 
rediscover µtraditional¶ practices, such as weaving, lacemaking and carpentry.91  
In 1945, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) made 
craft projects a central feature its postwar rehabilitation programmes, appointing an army of 
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welfare officers to Displaced Persons camps across Europe. These officers were responsible 
for the material conditions of displaced persons as well as preparing them for life beyond the 
camps. Through training in µmanual activities and handicrafts¶, UNRRA sought to provide 
rehabilitation in the broadest sense, preparing displaced persons to be productive, skilled 
community members when released.92 In the Displaced Persons camps, craft activities were 
used to occupy restless, imprisoned populations, to channel µnationalist sentiment¶ that camp 
administrators worried might create tension between ethnic groups, or be directed at camp 
administrators.93 Craft was seen as an acceptable vehicle for tokenized and idealized µnational 
cultures¶, expressed through µtraditional¶ artistic and artisanal practices. It was this belief in the 
disciplinary function of craft that the British Red Cross carried into Malaya. During the 
Malayan emergency, based on the UNRRA model for administering Displaced Persons camps, 
the Red Cross tasked their Welfare Officers with the provision of recreation in Malayan New 
Villages, primarily through craft initiatives directed specifically at women.94 
Based on their perceived successes in Malaya, Red Cross homecraft officers anticipated 
a warm welcome in Kenya, and were surprised by the so-called µMau Mau contaminated 
women¶ ZKR in spite of promises of items such as µbrightly coloured threads¶ and µused 
Christmas cards¶, were µsullen and uncooperative¶.95 Communal labour was compulsory in 
each village, and Red Cross workers reported that Kikuyu women would wait until the time of 
the next visit of a Red Cross Homecraft Officer was announced and then organize group labour 
to clash with the visit.96 In one incident, bricks were thrown at two homecraft officers in their 
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Red Cross jeep.97 In another, women poured condensed milk they had been given by the Red 
Cross for their children onto the ground.98 In the new villages, the death rate of children from 
malnutrition was 16.4%: refusing milk was a powerful gesture of defiance.99  
Despite their close partnership with the colonial state, the staff of the British Red Cross 
viewed their work as impartial and independent.100 Red Cross Overseas Branch Director Joan 
Whittington assumed that in Kenya, as in Malaya and Europe, the Red Cross banner would 
signal the independence of her organization from the colonial state, and Kenyan women would 
therefore be more open to Red Cross intervention. However, as Red Cross staff were 
accompanied at all times by British troops, the independence of the Red Cross from the state 
was not obvious to Kikuyu women.101 The hostile reception that homecraft workers received 
was part of a wider resistance to myriad forms of hard and soft colonial power. Red Cross 
workers, however, did not blame anticolonial politics for ZRPHQ¶V refusal to participate in 
µrehabilitation programmes.¶102 Rather, they claimed that Kikuyu ZRPHQ ODFNHG µWKUHH3V¶
pride in themselves, their homes, and their children. This lack of pride meant they could not 
see the value in the education that the Red Cross was offering.103 Homecraft officers also 
EHOLHYHG WKDW .LNX\X ZRPHQ¶V UHVLVWDQFH GHPRQVWUated their failure to understand the 
voluntary ethos that animated Red Cross work, because there was no analogous tradition in 
their own culture. One homecraft worker commented that Kikuyu women were µpuzzled¶ when  
asked to care for children other than their own, and, understandably, disbelieving when they 
heard that there µwere no poor in England, because everybody cares for one another¶.104 
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Successful µrehabilitation¶ of Kikuyu women would entail a wholescale cultural shift, the Red 
Cross believed, endowing them with pride in homemaking, and concern for the community.  
Concluding that the µrehabilitation of women could not be achieved through friendly 
cups of tea, sympathy and feeling that all past sins are forgotten¶, Red Cross workers sought 
reinforcement from District Commissioners, who made craft classes compulsory.105 At best, 
homecraft officers hoped that classes would endow women with individual pride and 
community spirit. At the very least, they reasoned, the supervised space of the craft class would 
provide µinnocent recreation¶ and prevent µidle gossip¶.106 However, with each Red Cross 
worker responsible for thirteen villages, the classes had little impact. As Kikuyu men began to 
return from prison in the middle of 1955, Red Cross workers warned that unreformed women 
PLJKWµre-contaminate rehabilitated men¶DQG XUJHGWKHFRORQLDOJRYHUQPHQWWRGHOD\WKHPHQ¶V
return. Frustrated by their failure, homecraft officers now proposed a form of emotional 
coercion, arguing that µjoining together as a family unit should be held out as a reward when a 
certain amount of rehabilitation has been achieved.¶107 In this way, the Red Cross inverted an 
ROGHUPLVVLRQDU\WUDGLWLRQRIVHSDUDWLQJZRPHQIURPPHQLQRUGHUWRµSURWHFW¶WKHZRPHQIURP
forced marriage or clitorectomy.108 1RZLWZDVWKHPHQZKRZHUHWREHKHOGEDFNWRµSURWHFW¶
WKHPIURPWKHµFRUUXSWLQJ¶LQIOXHQFHRIWKHZRPHQ 
Despite its efforts to influence the government, the British Red Cross could not control 
the rate at which men were released from the camps, so homecraft officers identified an 
alternative means of µgetting at the women¶: their children.109 In many of the new villages, 
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children were left unattended while women performed compulsory labour on nearby farms. 
Many became severely ill or malnourished due to food shortages and unsanitary conditions.110 
Echoing the critiques made by philanthropic elites of poor mothers across time and space, the 
Red Cross homecraft workers claimed that high child mortality in the villages was simply 
because African mothers did not care for their offspring. One homecraft worker claimed that it 
was µcommon¶ to see a µwell fed mother standing next to an emaciated child¶XQDZDUHWKDW 
this could be a direct result of the irregularity of the food provision, or the unevenness of the 
effects of malnutrition on adult and child bodies.111 To deal with malnutrition, the Red Cross 
RSHQHG'DJRUHWWL&KLOGUHQ¶V+RPHDVFKRRORUSKDQDJHDQGPHGLFDOFHQWUHIRUWKHµneediest¶ 
children of Central Province, imagining the gratitude of Kikuyu women IRUµDll we are doing 
for their children¶.112 Mothers were given no choice as to whether their children went into the 
&KLOGUHQ¶V+RPHKRZHYHU, and some children were forcibly separated from their mothers.113  
Dagoretti quickly became a flagship project for a host of NGOs, attracting funding from 
missionary organizations, UNICEF and Save the Children.114 Yet, housing only ninety 
FKLOGUHQ 'DJRUHWWL &KLOGUHQ¶V +RPH GLG OLWWOH WR DGGUHVV WKH UDSLGO\ ULVLQJ UDWH RI FKLOG
mortality in the new villages.115 Despite this, and the failure of officers to gain the trust and 
approval of Kenyan women, their work was perceived as an µoutstanding success¶ by the 
colonial government. At the end of 1956, %DULQJSURFODLPHGWKDW³VHZLQJDQGNQLWWLQJKDYH
done for more for the rehabilitation of Kenyan women and the reputation of the colony than 
WKH JRYHUQPHQW PLJKW HYHU KDYH DFKLHYHG RQ LWV RZQ WHUPV´116 Baring offered to pay the 
salaries of Red Cross Homecraft officers from government funds, an offer that Whittington 
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gladly accepted. For the British Red Cross, as for the Save the Children Fund, the lines between 
an µindependent¶ aid organization and the colonial state were becoming increasingly blurred.  
Collaboration between allegedly impartial humanitarian NGOs and the British state 
was by no means new. An international mixed economy of aid had existed for as long as aid 
organizations themselves. Founded in 1870 to provide impartial care to military casualties in 
the Franco-Prussian war, the British Red Cross had acted as an auxiliary of the British army 
by providing medical relief to soldiers and civilians in twentieth-century conflicts. Created in 
1919 to deliver µimpartial aid¶ to child victims of the First World War in Europe, Save the 
Children had gone on to distribute state-funded aid during the 1921 Russian famine and a host 
of humanitarian disasters thereafter.117 Co-operation during and after the Second World War 
further cemented pre-existing ties between society and state in the provision of humanitarian 
relief.118 Nonetheless, the work of the British Red Cross in colonial emergencies represented a 
significant departure from earlier activities. They were involved not just in state-sanctioned 
care for civilian populations, but the containment and punishment of large-scale revolt against 
British rule. In separating mothers from children, and seeking to make family reunification 
contingent on how far women enacted European forms of domesticity, the Red Cross endorsed 
a form of cultural and emotional coercion that has not yet been written into historical accounts 
of violence at the end of empire.   
 
III.  
The British Red Cross and the Save the Children Fund claimed to be internationalist, impartial 
organizations. Though based in Britain, they were affiliated with international parent bodies 
based in Geneva: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International 
                                                                    
117
 7HKLOD6DVVRQ³)URP(PSLUHWR+XPDQLW\7KH5XVVLDQ)DPLQHDQGWKH,PSHULDO2ULJLQV of International 
+XPDQLWDULDQLVP´Journal of British Studies, 55(3) (July 2016): 519-537. 
118
 Gerard Daniel Cohen, In War's Wake: Europe's Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order (New York, 2012), 
pp.59--HVVLFD5HLQLVFKµµAuntie UNRRA¶ at the crossroadV¶Past & Present, 218 (2013), 70-97.  
Union of Child Welfare (IUCW). Neither body had a large operational budget and both focused 
on discussing and co-ordinating the interventions of their nationally-based affiliates during 
crises. The ICRC, the IUCW and their worldwide affiliates were avowedly µnon-political¶, and 
claimed to work for the µgood of humanity¶. µImpartiality¶ had never precluded support for 
British imperialism, and internationalism and imperialism were not viewed as contradictory 
creeds. Indeed, leaders of the ICUW celebrated the British Empire as a model of international 
co-operation and brotherhood to which the rest of the world could aspire.119 When the British-
based branches of these international humanitarian organizations stepped in to address the 
shortcomings of the colonial state, they were attempting to improve the Empire, choosing to 
perceive it as an empire founded on brotherhood, benevolent rule and the duty of white 
metropolitan elites to µFLYLOLVH¶colonial subjects overseas. 
When damning critiques of colonial brutality were laid before them by Western anti-
colonial campaigning organizations and individual whistle-blowers, the British Red Cross and 
Save the Children insisted upon both the benevolence of colonial rule and the µimpartial¶ and 
WKHµnon-political¶ nature of their own work. They saw their role as caring for and ultimately 
µcuring¶ young and female Mau Mau sympathizers, rather than questioning the conduct of the 
colonial government. In March 1954 the ICUW received a series of petitions from the Kenya 
Committee for the Democratic Rights of Africans, a British anticolonial lobby group. The 
committee claimed that British policies in Kenya amounted to genocide, and that the only 
VROXWLRQ WR WKH .HQ\DQ HPHUJHQF\ ZRXOG EH JUDQWLQJ µIXQGDPHQWDO GHPRFUDWLF ULJKWV¶ WR
Africans.120 The president of the International Union declined to respond, reasoning that even 
if he regarded the Mau Mau as a political movement (which he did not), he could not support 
its aims due to the µstrictly impartial nature¶ of Save the Children. Tacit support for the colonial 
government, on the other hand, was cast as µnon-political¶: it simply entailed µchild welfare 
                                                                    
119
 %DXJKDQµµ(YHU\&LWL]HQRI(PSLUH,PSORUHGWR6DYHWKH&KLOGUHQ¶¶SS-137. 
120
 Frida Laski to SCIU, March 17th 1954, AP 92.68.5, AEG. 
work¶, which was understood as inherently neutral.121 Even if the Save the Children 
International Union had opposed the actions of either the colonial government or the British 
Save the Children Fund in Kenya, it would not have intervened. Its policy was to respect the 
sovereignties of national and colonial states.122 This had kept it from intervening on behalf of 
Jewish children who were victims of the Nazi regime in 1930s Germany, and in the 1950s, 
from criticising the emerging apartheid regime in South Africa.123  
The ICRC, on the other hand, had been given a mandate by the 1949 Geneva 
Convention to transcend sovereignties in wartime in order to ensure that prisoners of war were 
treated according to internationally agreed standards. The ICRC response to the Kenyan 
Emergency was certainly more robust than that of the International Council for Child Welfare, 
and has been the focus of two important studies by Fabien Klose and Yolanda Pringle. As they 
show, the ICRC regarded Kenyan emergency as a civil war, and demanded access to the prison 
camps that held suspected Mau Mau.124 The British Red Cross was affronted by this request 
and argued that the Kenyan emergency was a rebellion, not a war, and that the 1949 Geneva 
Convention was therefore not applicable.125 Reading the work of the ICRC through the archives 
of the British Red Cross reveals how, for the latter organisation, patriotism trumped 
humanitarian internationalism.  
The British Red Cross thus sided with the British government rather than its own 
international parent body, both covering up colonial brutality and acting against criticisms of 
its own work. In private correspondence, ICRC officials claimed that WKH%ULWLVK5HG&URVV¶V 
President Lady Limerick was either ignorant of the extent of Kenyan suffering and colonial 
violence ± µunpardonable¶ ± or that she was aware of the extent of suffering but was µhushing 
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things up (equally unpardonable)¶.126 The ICRC was dismissive of the work that the British 
Red Cross had been doing in the new villages, noting that the appalling rate of child mortality 
was rising.127 The ICRC was even more disparaging of the claims that the British Red Cross 
had visited detainees in governmental prison camps, suspecting instead that British Red Cross 
representatives were more interested in the camp guards. µHow much time, do you think¶, 
wrote one ICRC delegate, µZRXOG EH OHIW WR D µPRWKHUO\ W\SH RI 5HG &URVV ZRUNHU¶ RU D
UHDVRQDEO\\RXQJDQGDWWUDFWLYHµ5HG&URVVQXUVH¶ for Kikuyu detainees in view of the presence 
of the poor [colonial police] boys who have had SUCH a hard life¶.128 Noting the divergence 
between British Red Cross accounts of successful interventions, and journalistic reports of 
poverty in the villages and torture in the prisons, the ICRC concluded that British Red Cross 
³GLG127GRLWVGXW\´LQ.HQ\D129  
The British Red Cross had, in fact, chastised the colonial government about the sanitary 
FRQGLWLRQVRISULVRQHUVVWDWLQJWKDWVRPHFDPSVZHUH³XQILWHYHQWRKRXVHDQLPDOV´,Q
the BritisK 5HG &URVV GHPDQGHG WKDW WKH %ULWLVK JRYHUQPHQW VKRXOG GR ³VRPHWKLQJ RQ WKH
KHDOWK VLGH RI WKLQJV´ WR LPSURYH FRQGLWLRQV DQG EHOLHYHG WKDW WKLV DGYLFH KDG EHHQ DFWHG
upon.130 British Red Cross representatives who visited the camps did not, however, object to 
the interrogation and punishment methods used, which oral testimonies and recovered 
documents would later reveal involved torture, forced exercise, forced labour and routine 
deprivation of food, water and medical attention. While it is possible that British Red Cross 
delegates were not fully aware of these practices, a number of its representatives in Kenya felt 
that ³%ULWLVKMXVWLFHLQLWVWUDGLWLRQDOIRUPLVKRSHOHVVO\XQVXLWDEOHLQWKHSUHVHQWVLWXDWLRQ´131 
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Drawing on racialized perceptions of Mau Mau inmates as unstable and irrational, one British 
Red Cross visitor claimed that a µmuch more rapid form of judgement and punishment is 
needed if it is to be effective with the Kikuyu¶ and concluded that µsummary justice¶ within the 
camps was reasonable and necessary.132 Lady Limerick agreed that the µattacks¶ on prisons and 
the pipeline by the ICRC were µscurrilous and unjustifiable¶.133  
Governor of Kenya Evelyn Baring (whose wife was the president of the Kenyan 
affiliate of the British Red Cross) drew upon the endorsement of the British Red Cross to argue 
that further inspection of prisons by the ICRC was both unnecessary and unjustified under the 
Geneva Conventions.134  Nevertheless, criticism of Kenyan prisons at Westminster and in the 
British and international press intensified. In response, the colonial government in 1957 
acquiesced to ICRC demands, allowing a visit to the prisons as a µgesture of goodwill¶ while 
continuing to insist that they did not fall under international law.135 Once the visit of the ICRC 
was announced, and the reputation of the Empire was at risk, the British Red Cross sprang into 
action. In the weeks prior to the ICRC visit, the British Red Cross provided additional blankets, 
medical equipment and clothes to several prisons. British Red Cross leaders helped to plan an 
itinerary for ICRC colleagues, attempting to stage-manage their visit by suggesting tours of a 
µsuccessful¶ village homecraft schemes, orphanages and youth camps, while avoiding the 
quarters of injured prison inmates.136 The ICRC report from the 1957 visit concluded that the 
prison camps were µin keeping with humanitarian principles¶.137  
Ultimately, the failure of ICRC probably had much less to do with the British Red Cross 
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DWWHPSWWRFRYHUXSSULVRQYLROHQFHWKHQLWGLGZLWKZKDWWKHµPRUDOERXQGDULHV¶RIWKH,&5&¶V
own humanitarianism.138 Unlike the British Red Cross, the ICRC felt no allegiance to the 
British imperial project per se; however, its worldview was underscored by shared notions of 
racial and civilizational hierarchy. Despite the antipathy between the two parties, the ICRC and 
the British Red Cross not only shared a similar understanding of European superiority in 
Kenya: they also ultimately performed the same function in the Emergency, deflecting and 
distracting from criticisms of colonial policy.   
As public critique intensified in Britain, questions raised in the press or in parliament 
about conduct in Kenya often centred on the plight of women and children, and could be 
addressed by citing the µexcellent work¶RI the Save the Children Fund, the British Red Cross, 
and various missionary societies.139 Save the Children and the British Red Cross issued regular 
ringing endorsements of the colonial government that had (they claimed) ensured that the 
³emergency has not been allowed to interfere with the long-term welfare of these people´, and 
had instead used it as an opportunity to make ³far seeing plans´ for education and social 
reform.140 Once the ICRC had issued its own favourable report in 1957, it was invoked 
repeatedly by the British government and the colonial government in Kenya to counter 
allegations of torture. When, in February 1959 eleven men were brutally murdered at the Hola 
prison camp in Kenya, prompting international outcry, Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, 
suggested that the ICRC should be invited to visit prisons once again. Having been initially 
resistant to international humanitarian scrutiny, Lennox-Boyd now recognised its function in 
legitimating ± or at least obscuring ± the violent practices of imprisonment.    
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Humanitarian attention to Kenya also provided a compelling narrative of the Mau Mau 
emergency for the British and international public. When Save the Children launched its Kenya 
appeal in 1955, it raised more money than in any year since 1921, during its major Russian 
Famine appeal.141 Donations to the Red Cross similarly spiked. By donating to the Kenya 
appeals of these organizations, the British public was given a means to engage with the 
Emergency while ignoring its broader political context. Both the British Red Cross and Save 
the Children used images of children almost exclusively in their appeals; as in so many 
humanitarian appeals, these images served to obscure the broader political context of the 
Kenyan Emergency. Children were presented as µvictims of Mau Mau¶a force that victimized 
both black Kenyans and white settlers.142 Public giving to the Kenya Emergency appeals did 
not simply express support for the colonial government, but also compassion for the Kenyan 
people. Through the interventions of British-based international humanitarian organizations, 
the good of the empire and the good of humanity were aligned in the eyes of the British public, 
and the brutality of the colonial violence was obscured. Kenya became a site of benevolent 
intervention, rather than political struggle.   
 
Conclusion 
When Kenyan women who had been imprisoned returned to their children, many found that 
their breast milk had dried up. Red Cross homecraft officers provided these women with milk 
powder purchased by UNICEF.143 UNICEF milk was keeping child subjects of empire alive, 
as international aid organizations were in turn preserving the image of a benevolent empire in 
an era when colonial violence contradicted new international norms. Yet, the mothers who 
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were given this milk for their children did not draw distinctions between the colonial state, the 
British-led aid organization that distributed the milk, and the UN-affiliated aid organization 
that funded it. To them, the milk was not a symbol of international compassion, but of colonial 
control. Pouring the milk on the ground was a gesture of defiance against the state that had 
moved them to barren land and imprisoned their communities. To colonised communities the 
lines between the colonial state and non-state aid organizations, and between imperial violence 
and international aid, were far from self-evident.   
Yet, despite these blurred boundaries, the existing literature on humanitarianism has 
often taken claims of impartiality as a starting point, with both historians and contemporary 
commentators broadly assuming that aid organizations overcame ethical misgivings in order 
to collaborate with states, and that collaboration with states was a reluctant compromise made 
when they could not otherwise access suffering populations. Rather, as we have seen, across 
the British Empire during its violent decolonization struggles, collusion with the state was an 
opportunity to expand humanitarian work and uphold a vision of British imperialism they 
believed compatible to be with international humanitarian ideals. Humanitarian organizations 
sought to diminish the impact of colonial violence on both civilian populations and the public 
image of Empire. Humanitarian intervention lent credence to the notion that µrehabilitation¶ 
was a modernising project, drawing on international expertise to aid colonial peoples caught 
between tradition and modernity. In Kenya, it delegitimised Mau Mau as a political movement, 
portraying anticolonial resistance as psychosis rather than political grievance. The basis for 
collusion between humanitarian organizations and the state was this shared vision of the 
emergency as a crisis of transition between tradition and modernity, and a shared understanding 
of µrehabilitation¶. This notion rested on invented tradition: an idealized, colonial African past 
to which Kenyans could be restored, while also benefitting from a modern capitalist economy.  
During the wars of decolonization, humanitarian NGOs were not only rewriting the 
cRORQLDO SDVW EXW SUHVHUYLQJ WKH HPSLUH¶V IXWXUH ,Q WKH V WHUULWRULDO FRORQLDOLVP ZDV
replaced ZLWKµH[SHUW¶ western aid organizations, as they flocked to recently decolonized states 
to oversee agricultural, welfare and development projects.144 Although such projects 
symbolized new eras of partnership and development, the staff had often gained their 
experience and ideals through colonial service.145 Humanitarian interventions would continue 
to ensure that the ideals of British colonialism remained embedded in postcolonial states. In 
Kenya, humanitarian interventions that began during the emergency endured long after 
independence. For example, 'DJRUHWWL &KLOGUHQ¶V +RPH¶V µrehabilitation¶ work continues 
today, and since 1954 has drawn the support of missionary bodies, national Red Cross 
committees, the development programmes of a number of European states and local Kenyan 
elites. In 1964, Dagoretti was celebrated as a µshining beacon of Harambee¶DQG the µself-help¶ 
agenda promoted by the postcolonial government as a check on Western intervention.146 
Drawing on the model of (and employing staff from) Wamumu, the Save the Children Fund 
opened the much-FHOHEUDWHG 6WDUHKH %R\V¶ 6FKRRO LQ 147 Beloved by former colonial 
officials and postcolonial Kenyan governments alike, the school continues to attract donations 
from major businesses and NGOs. In 1960, Save the Children appointed the former Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, as their president. The unanimous appointment 
of Lennox-Boyd, who conspired to cover up torture and prison massacres in Kenya, was 
regarded as a celebration and confirmation of the close ties that the Save the Children Fund 
had forged with the Colonial Office during the Kenyan and Malayan Emergencies.148 At the 
height of colonial violence, and under the auspices of international aid organizations, 
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individuals and ideals from the late colonial period became embedded in the social and 
educational projects of postcolonial states, and the wider structures of humanitarian 
internationalism.  
Rehabilitation was not just a project designed to discredit the decolonization struggles of 
imperial subjects. In the 1950s, international humanitarian organizations sought to rehabilitate 
the image of British imperialism in Kenya and across the globe. The collusion of humanitarian 
organisations enabled the British Colonial Office to meet critiques of colonial violence with 
assertions of benevolence, but violence and humanitarianism were not separate aspects of 
British imperialism. In Kenya, self-proclaimed internationalist humanitarian organisations 
colluded with the colonial state in the incarceration, resettlement and emotional coercion of 
civilian subjects. Humanitarians did not experience this collusion with the colonial state as a 
contradiction, but as an opportunity to showcase both their internationally-gathered expertise 
and the benevolence of the British Empire. By becoming embedded in the apparatus of colonial 
welfare, aid organisations ensured that humanitarian interventions would be recognised as a 
lasting legacy of empire, even as the colonial violence that had provided the impetus for these 
interventions was forgotten.    
